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2.1 Introduction
The stereotype of the housing problem of the elderly is the following
case:
Mrs. R. is a 74-year-old widow who continues to live alone in the
four-bedroom family home. She has difficulty paying the utilities on
this dwelling and has been unable to adequately maintain the prop-
erty. Because of arthritis, she has increasing difficulty with the stairs.
Mrs. R's house is fully paid for. If she were to sell it, she could easily
afford the rent on an apartment in a nearby housing complex for the
elderly. However, despite the urging of her children, she has resisted
moving, claiming the alternative is "too expensive" and she is "not
sure she would like it."
The main question we will address in this paper is whether this
stereotype is accurate. Is there a significant elderly population living
in housing that appears to be inappropriate in terms of physical needs
and financial resources? Are the elderly constrained by illiquidity of
assets and therefore forced to move to smaller properties or rentals to
dissave? If so, does the market fail to provide alternatives, or through
some imperfection does it create barriers to moving? Or, is lack of
mobility a "rational" manifestation of tastes?
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The effects of policy interventions in the elderly housing market
depend on the answers to these questions. If the stereotype is perva-
sive, then marketwide policies may be effective; otherwise, concen-
tration on programs directed to individuals in trouble may be indicated.
If the elderly face significant imperfections in the housing market, then
initiatives that reduce imperfections by providing information, insur-
ance, risk pooling, or licensing may help to reduce the imperfection.
If tastes are the source of the problem, then the question is whether
one can, or should, modify tastes through promotional campaigns. If
intervention appears appropriate, should it be directed to programs
that permit the elderly to stay on in their homes, such as reverse annuity
mortgages and home care services? Or, is it better to encourage trading
down, thus freeing larger dwellings for the market, by policies such as
deferral of capital gains taxes, assistance in searching for housing, and
reverse annuity mortgages applied to trade-downs?
This investigation concentrates on the effects of wealth, cash flow,
and changes in household demographics on mobility and housing ex-
penditure decisions of the elderly. We examine several issues. First,
do mobility patterns suggest the presence of significant capital market
imperfections that prevent elderly owners from life-cycle dissaving?
Second, are moves closely associated with demographic shocks such
as retirement, death of a spouse, or children leaving home, so that
economic incentives (and policies that affect these incentives) would
impact elderly households through rather narrow windows? Finally, do
'these variables collectively provide an adequate description of mobility
among the elderly, or is there evidence of substantial remaining unex-
plained variation among households?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2
provides descriptive statistics of our data set, which is based on the
PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics). Section 2.3 presents esti-
mates of a series of models of mobility and changes in housing status
among movers. Section 2.4 provides a test for the presence of unob-
served heterogeneity among households. Section 2.5 presents some
conclusions and section 2.6 a discussion of potential future research.
An appendix provides some data details.
2.2 Some Descriptive Statistics
Using the PSID, we have summarized a few features of housing
behavior of the elderly. We have used the first fifteen waves of the
panel, from 1968 through 1982. We confine our attention to households
that in 1968 had either head or wife over 50 years of age; there are
1,131 households meeting this condition. First, what is the mobility of



























































rates by age of head in each of three periods. Mobility rates decline
from the 55-64 age bracket to the 65-74 age bracket, but rise (insig-
nificantly) in the 75 + age bracket. Mobility appears to be slightly higher
after 1972 than before; figure 2.1 shows the mobility rate of households
with heads over 65 by year. Table 2.2 presents the pattern of tenure
changes with moves for households with heads over 65. The "other"
category in this table encompasses a variety of arrangements, such as
living with relatives, living in a place of business, or living on a working
81







Tenure Changes with Moves, Age 65 +






















































farm. The table shows 32.4 percent of moves result in tenure changes.
There is a modest net flow from owning to the remaining categories.
Thus, the crude evidence suggests only weak disaccumulation of real
assets by exiting ownership. This pattern is consistent with that found
by Merrill (1984) in the Retirement History Survey (RHS).
How pervasive is occupancy of "inappropriate" housing by the el-
derly? Merrill (1984) reports from RHS data the following median ratios
for a sample who were between ages 66 and 71 in 1977, and who were
homeowners in 1969, or 1977, or both:
Home equity as a proportion of wealth 0.763
Ratio of shelter cost/income 0.167
Persons per room 0.333
Consider the information on dwelling size in the PSID. Define, ar-
bitrarily, excess size to be a dwelling with a number of rooms exceeding
the number of residents plus three. Table 2.3 shows for three periods
the proportion of households of each age living in dwellings of excess
size. First, note that the proportion of households in large dwellings
is substantial. While this may simply reflect tastes for consumption of
housing services in a well-functioning market, it nevertheless indicates
the potential for substantial transfers of housing services to younger
families. The proportion in units of excess size increases with age. The
pattern has not shifted substantially over time.
How pervasive is occupancy of "unaffordable" housing by the el-
derly? To answer this question, we have compared income with out-






Households in Dwellings of "Excess" Size (cases,










































Note: A dwelling is defined to be of "excess" size if the number of rooms less the family
size exceeds 3.
of-pocket housing costs for homeowners are the sum of utility costs,
mortgage payments, property taxes, and maintenance and insurance
costs. Maintenance and insurance costs are imputed to equal 2 percent
of house value. This is based on a maintenance rate of 1.5 percent of
house value, obtained from unit expenditures given in the U.S. Bureau
of the Census Construction Reports (Series C50). For renters, the hous-
ing cost variable is the sum of utility costs and rent. Construction of
these variables is detailed in the appendix. Housing budget share is
defined as the ratio of out-of-pocket housing costs to current after-tax
income. Table 2.4 shows the average housing budget share for owners
and renters in various age categories in three periods. This table ex-
cludes both households in "other" living arrangements and "poverty-
level" households with disposable income below $5,000 in 1982 dollars.
Renter budget shares are comparable to those for owners. (Remember
that these are cash flow shares and do not reflect capital gains to
owners.) For the entire 1968-82 period, there is a decline in budget
share from the 55-64 age category to the 65-74 category, then a mar-
ginal increase to the 75 + age category. Over time, renter budget shares
have been stable, while owner budget shares have increased.
Table 2.5 gives the distribution of the share of out-of-pocket housing
costs in income by age bracket for homeowners and for renters. Note
first that 8.8 percent of renters and 10.8 percent of owners have budget
shares exceeding 0.4. For owners, there are mitigating factors, includ-
ing capital gains in equity and the possibility of deferring maintenance.
Nevertheless, there is an economically significant elderly population
for whom financing shelter costs from cash flow is burdensome. Sec-
ond, there is a clear pattern of an increasing proportion of high-burden
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is no evidence of increasing burden with age; the proportion of high-
burden households in the 75 + age category is less than that for house-
holds in the 55-65 category.
The life-cycle theory of consumption implies that expenditures, on
housing services should be determined by lifetime wealth (and life-
cycle demographics) rather than by current income or wealth com-
position, with transitory income fluctuations smoothed by asset changes.
The operation of this theory requires good capital markets without
credit rationing or wedges between buying and selling prices for assets.
In particular, for individuals whose assets are primarily an owner-
occupied dwelling, life-cycle planning would often require the market
to finance dissaving by the elderly through borrowing secured by equity
in the dwelling (e.g., reverse annuity mortgages). Alternatives are for
the elderly to extract equity by trading-down to smaller owner-occupied
housing, moving to a rental, or deferring maintenance and repair. On
the other hand, bequest motives may encourage ownership as a con-
venient channel for holding assets.
Using the PSID data, we have constructed a measure of wealth from
age-specific income and assets, observed future wage and transfer in-
come during the period of the panel, and made projections of those























































































































































































appendix. Table 2.6 shows mobility rates classified by wealth and age
categories. There is no uniform pattern of mobility shifts with age within
a wealth category. The table indicates sharply decreasing mobility with
increasing wealth for renters, but relatively little effect of wealth on
owner mobility. With owners concentrated in higher wealth brackets,
the mobility variation with wealth for all households combined is a
correlate of the differences of mobility between owners and renters.
To a considerable extent, tenure choice is endogenously related to the
propensity to move, with the transactions costs of ownership encour-
aging renting by highly mobile households, and the lower costs of
moving encouraging more frequent "fine tuning" of housing consump-
tion by renters. Self-selection into the population of owners is likely
to yield low-wealth households that have a low propensity to move.
These results indicate that association of wealth and mobility in the

























































































The existence of substantial assets other than an owner-occupied
dwelling should facilitate decumulation of wealth and reduce the need
for owners to downsize their houses or switch tenure. Table 2.7 shows
mobility rates classified by wealth and liquidity, where a household is
classified as "liquid" if it has after-tax income above $10,000 or assets
(other than an owner-occupied dwelling) exceeding $20,000 in 1982
dollars. Mobility rates are significantly elevated for renters with less
than $90,000 in wealth; there is no consistent pattern of declining mo-
bility with increasing liquidity.
If life-cycle theory applies, and the elderly are able directly or in-
directly to dissave at rates that depend only on wealth, then mobility
rates given wealth should be independent of current income and the
composition of wealth. Then, in particular, mobility should be inde-
pendent of the liquidity of the household. Table 2.7 shows no significant
decline for liquid versus nonliquid households when wealth is held
constant.63 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly


































































For households with head aged 65 + , table 2.8 shows mobility by
current income and asset class for various wealth classes. The evidence
suggests no variation in mobility rates with income or wealth compo-
sition once wealth is fixed. Thus, these data are generally consistent
with the life-cycle theory and suggest that liquidity constraints on the
elderly are not pervasive.
2.3 Simple Models of Elderly Housing Dynamics
In this section, we estimate simple models of a rational life-cycle
household facing the decision of whether to move and, if moving,
whether to "downsize" to a smaller or less expensive dwelling. Eco-
nomic theory indicates that the consumer will choose lifetime con-
sumption profiles, including choice of housing, by solving a dynamic







Mobility Rates by Income and Wealth


















































































subject to intertemporal budget constraints whose structure depends
on the capital market. Henderson and Ioannides (1986) have developed
a model with this structure; related models have been proposed by
Artie and Varaiya (1978) and Hu (1980). In principle, these models can
explain joint choice of shelter consumption levels, moving, and tenure.
In practice, the models are intractable except for special cases, such
as stationarity assumptions that allow application of renewal theory.
Consequently, these models must be used primarily to motivate the
qualitative features of empirical demand models. This problem is par-
ticularly acute when the assumption of a perfect capital market is re-
laxed to permit liquidity constraints and wedges between borrowing
and lending rates.
Consider the decision to move. The life-cycle model suggests that
in each period the household starts from a state described by wealth
(measured as the sum of home equity, other assets, and the expected
present value of future income flows), characteristics of current dwell-
ing, and demographic characteristics. For these state variables, the
household calculates the present value of remaining utility for optimal
consumption plans with and without a current period move, taking into
account the cost of a move. A move is made if it yields the higher
expected utility. In a perfect capital market, the consumer's intertem-
poral consumption plans, including move decisions, depend only on
total wealth, not on its composition. (We abstract from the implications
of portfolio composition for risk.) In particular, cash flow or holdings65 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly
of liquid assets should affect consumption decisions once the effects
of wealth are taken into account only if there are capital market im-
perfections. Capital market failure is most likely for low-income house-
holds with limited assets other than home ownership. Welfeld and Struyk
(1978) have pointed out that a significant number of elderly households
below the poverty line have this wealth configuration. The efficacy of
the policy initiative to promote reverse annuity mortgages depends on
whether liquidity constraints are in fact binding on these households.
In addition to wealth, and possibly cash flow and liquidity measures,
the life-cycle model suggests that housing choice behavior will depend
on demographic characteristics of the household, possibly interacting
with features of the dwelling. Changes in household composition that
alter the need for housing services should be important, as should
retirement decisions that relax locational constraints. An interesting
question for policy is whether these demographic changes affect mo-
bility only over a limited period of time, giving only a narrow window
in which programs to influence the destination of moves can be effec-
tive. The life-cycle model also suggests that housing choices will be
sensitive to prices, in particular to the comparison of the expected
stream of net cost savings from a move with the direct and indirect
moving costs. Housing prices are difficult to construct for the full panel
of elderly households in the PSID, and analysis of their effect is left
for future research.
An econometric model that captures the qualitative features of the
life-cycle consumer model can be defined in terms of the marginal
probability that a household will move in a year times the conditional
probability, given a move, that various alternatives are chosen. The
marginal probability of a move is a function of the variables described
above and, in general, can depend on previous state, including dwelling
size, shelter expenditure, tenure, and dwelling type. The alternatives
available, given a move, range in principle over the full set of features
entering the description of the household's state. In particular, the set
of alternatives includes both discrete variables, such as tenure, dwelling
type, and number of rooms, and continuous variables, such as shelter
expenditure. The current analysis will be limited to one aspect of dwell-
ing choice, an indicator for changes in shelter expenditure. This permits
us to examine the phenomenon of "downsizing" to extract equity or
reduce shelter cost. Other aspects of choice among housing alternatives
will be left for future research which will examine the effects of housing
prices on choices. It will be of particular interest to estimate fully
specified models for transitions between alternative states that can be
used in dynamic policy simulation of the housing behavior of the elderly.
In addition to dependence on demographic and housing state of mo-
bility probabilities and conditional probabilities for choice among hous-
ing alternatives, there may be unobserved variations across households66 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
in tastes for moving, a "mover-stayer" effect. The combination of
dependence on previous state and population heterogeneity creates the
econometrically difficult "initial values problem" discussed by Heck-
man (1981). In addition, statistical dependence across states induced
by the heterogeneity makes it necessary to model the probabilities of
entire panel decision sequences, which may be computationally bur-
densome. Further, the effect of heterogeneity is to bias estimates of
durations of spells between moves because of "self-selection" over
time of households more resistant to moving.
In this paper, we do not attempt to deal with unobserved hetero-
geneity. We instead assume housing choice behavior can be modeled
as an independent Bernoulli process over years (with time-dependent
explanatory variables). This simplistic modeling assumption permits us
to examine some of the qualitative features predicted by the life-cycle
model that are not particularly sensitive to the time profile of mobility
rates for a single household. However, it should be noted that the
resulting estimated models are likely to be badly biased for describing
features that depend critically on time dependence, such as duration
of spells between moves or number of moves. Some sense of the quality
of the assumption of no unobserved heterogeneity can be obtained by
examining the numbers of multiple moves made in the PSID panel.
Table 2.9 compares the observed number of moves with the numbers































































Notes: Model 1: Bernoulli model with mobility rate 13.6 percent (maximum likelihood
estimate), goodness-of-fit statistic 971 (chi-square with 12 degrees of freedom).
Model 2: Mixture of 0.238 "stayers," 0.61 with mobility rate 12.0 percent, 0.152 with
mobility rate 42.4 percent (minimum chi-square estimates), goodness-of-fit statistic 14.7
(chi-square with 8 degrees of freedom).67 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly
sic long-tail characteristic of heterogeneity. Model 1 is a homogeneous
Bernoulli model, estimated by maximum likelihood. A goodness-of-fit
test strongly rejects the Bernoulli model. Model 2 is a mixture of stayers
and two Bernoulli populations, one with a mobility rate of 12 percent
and the second with a mobility rate of 42.4 percent, with the mixing
probabilities and mobility rates fitted by minimum chi-square. This
model is accepted by a goodness-of-fit test at the 95 percent significance
level. This model corresponds very roughly to a population of "own-
ers" who are either stayers or have the 12 percent mobility rate, and
a population of "renters" with the 42.4 percent mobility rate. Neither
model is a good test for unobserved heterogeneity in the PSID sample,
since variation in explanatory variables, which will also tend to produce
rejections of simple Bernoulli models, is not accounted for. However,
the very poor fit of Model 1 and the significant fraction of stayers in
Model 2 suggest that unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be signifi-
cant. Later in this paper, we carry out a more precise Lagrange Mul-
tiplier test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
Consider first the marginal move decision. Under the assumptions
set out above, this can be independently modeled as a discrete choice
for each household and each period of observation. We assume a probit
functional form. We fit this model to the pooled PSID data, beginning
with lagged wealth (the household's assets as of last period) and head
age as explanatory variables, and then adding variables that may enter
if liquidity constraints are binding or if demographics influence con-
sumption decisions. Table 2.10 shows that wealth has a significant



































*Denotes significant at the 5% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.68 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
negative effect on mobility. Mobility falls with age of head until age
74, then increases. Mobility is insensitive to changes in wealth.
Table 2.11 introduces cash flow and an indicator for liquidity to test
for the significance of capital market imperfections that introduce li-
quidity constraints. The new variables are LIQLAG, indicating either
that last period's after-tax income was above $10,000 or that non-
dwelling assets were above $20,000, in 1982 dollars, as of last period,
and CASHLAG, measuring after-tax income of the head and spouse
last period, and CASHOTHERLAG, measuring after-tax income of
other household members last period. (These variables are lagged, as
is the wealth variable, to avoid simultaneity biases in estimation.) The
LIQLAG variable is found to have a significant effect on mobility rates,
with mobility falling for liquid households; CASHLAG and CASH-
OTHERLAG are insignificant. This provides mixed evidence that cap-
ital market imperfections may be a quantitatively significant constraint
on behavior in the elderly population. However, there is some con-
founding of the effects of liquidity when owners and renters who face
different moving costs are pooled. If liquidity is positively associated
with ownership, and hence lower mobility due to higher moving costs,
then LIQLAG will display a negative coefficient for this reason and
may not represent capital market imperfections. A significant liquidity













































*Denotes significant at the 5% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.69 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly
effect for owners or renters separately would be stronger evidence for
capital market problems.
Table 2.12 introduces family composition effects, including a dummy
variable that indicates that a wife who was present in one of the previous
two periods has now gone (WIFEGONE), the number of persons who
have moved out of the household since the previous period (MOVE-
OUT), the number of persons who have moved in (MOVEIN), and the
change in the number of children living at home (ACHILDREN). As
in the earlier models, wealth and head age are significant, as are LIQLAG
and CASHLAG. The demographic shocks of a wife disappearing or
















































*Denotes significant at the 5% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.70 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
individuals moving into the household significantly increase mobility,
as does a decrease in the number of children living at home. Positive
values of the variable MOVEOUT usually occur because the husband
disappears, the wife is gone, or a child moves out. Since the latter two
events are captured by the WIFEGONE and ACHILDREN variables,
the coefficient on MOVEOUT primarily reflects the event of the hus-
band disappearing. This event also increases mobility, but not
significantly.
Merrill (1984) found that the event of retiring had a significant effect
on mobility in the RHS, with a peak several years after retirement.
Table 2.12 includes dummy variables indicating whether the head or
the wife have retired within the past three years. Both husband and
wife retirement dummies are found to significantly increase mobility.
Hence, there appears to be a window of relatively high mobility for
several years after retirement, as households optimize after being freed
of the locational constraints imposed by workplace.
The preceding models do not distinguish tenure state as a factor
influencing mobility. Since moving costs are considerably higher for
owners than for renters, one expects the former group to have lower
transition probabilities. Table 2.13 shows the basic model of mobility
dependence on head age and wealth, estimated separately for owners
Table 2.13 Independent Trials Probit Model of Mobility, Wealth and Cash















































*Denotes significant at the 5% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.71 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly
and for renters. In these models, head age remains significant for own-
ers, with mobility minimized at age 70. For renters, mobility declines
(insignificantly) until age 83. Wealth is not significant for either owners
or renters. Of course, this does not indicate wealth has an insignificant
effect on the dynamics of rental housing demand, since tenure choice
is endogenous, and wealth is likely to strongly influence tenure choice
conditioned on moves. The variables called CASHLAG, LIQLAG, and
CASHOTHERLAG measuring liquidity are found to be insignificant
for both owners and renters. This supports the view that the signifi-
cance found in table 2.12 for these variables is due to their correlation
with moving costs through the association of liquidity and ownership.
While this conclusion should be interpreted with caution in light of the
issues of endogeneity of tenure choice and population heterogeneity,
it has a potentially important policy implication that programs such as
reverse annuity mortgages, designed to allow the elderly to extract
equity from their homes, are unlikely to be utilized by most of the
elderly population.
Table 2.14 estimates separately for owners and renters the model
including family composition effects. The pattern of effects is similar
to that observed in table 2.12 estimated on owners and renters together,
except that wealth and cash flow effects are both insignificant. The
effects of family composition changes are similar for owners and renters.
Estimates of tenure choice of movers are given separately in table
2.15 for previous owners and for previous renters. The effect of liquidity
constraints or low cash income is to discourage ownership, but the
effects are statistically insignificant. Increasing wealth increases own-
ership for both previous owners and renters, as does a family com-
position change increasing household size. Retirement of the head
significantly discourages ownership by previous owners.
Next consider the conditional probability of changing consumption
of housing services, given a move. We consider first a categorical vari-
able (RECOST) that indicates whether expenditures on shelter fall more
than 5 percent (- 1) or not (0). Table 2.16 gives the results of estimation,
separately for owners and renters. Wealth has a weak positive effect
on maintaining expenditures by owners. The variable LIQLAG has a
significant negative effect among renters, and both LIQLAG and
CASHLAG are insignificant among owners. HE ADAGE is statistically
insignificant, as are the family composition variables.
Second, consider the conditional probability of reducing dwelling
size, measured relative to family size, given a move. The dependent
variable (DEXSIZE) is categorical, indicating whether number of rooms
minus family size falls with the move (-1) or not (0). Table 2.17 gives
the estimates. Wealth is again insignificant. Many of the family com-
position variables are significant for both owners and renters, while72 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
Table 2.14 Independent Trials Probit Model of Mobility, Family Composition













































































*Denotes significant at the 5% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
the retirement dummies are insignificant. Among the lagged liquidity
variables, LIQLAG is positive and significant among owners and in-
significant among renters, while CASHLAG is insignificant.
Finally, consider changes in equity given a move. We consider a
categorical variable (DEQUITY) that indicates whether equity falls
(-1) or not (0). Table 2.18 gives the estimation results for owners.
Wealth is again insignificant; the estimates indicate no significant effect
of liquidity, suggesting either that most owners have sufficient cash
flow or liquid assets to make extraction of equity unnecessary, or that
existing capital markets provide adequate opportunities for extracting
equity. Demographic and retirement variables are insignificant.73 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly











































































*Denotes significant at the 5% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
The effects of age on mobility of owners and renters are summarized
in figure 2.2; the mobility of owners rises after age 70, while the mobility
of renters falls until age 79. Given a move, the probability that a former
owner or renter becomes an owner is given in figure 2.3. The probability
of ownership falls steadily with age for owners, and is nearly constant
for renters. Figure 2.4 gives the probabilities that when an owner moves,
the adjustment maintains the level of expenditures on housing, excess
size of housing, and equity in housing. The probability of maintaining
housing costs rises with age, while the probability of maintaining excess
rooms falls. The probability of maintaining equity falls after age 71. Fig-
ures 2.2,2.3, and 2.4 are calculated for a "standard" low-income house-
hold with wealth of $10,000, cash income of $5,000, and population74 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
Table 2.16 Changes in Shelter Cost Among Movers (independent probit,









































































*Denotes significant at the 5% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
averages for other variables; the models used are in tables 2.13, 2.16,
2.17, and 2.18.
The mobility of owners varies little with income or wealth, increasing
from 0.041 to 0.042 as income rises from $5,000 to $40,000 with wealth
fixed at $10,000, and falling from 0.041 to 0.040 as wealth increases
from $10,000 to $140,000 with income fixed at $5,000. The mobility of
renters increases sharply with income and decreases with wealth, as
shown in figure 2.5. In particular, mobility is high for renters with low
liquidity. The wealth categories in this figure are $10,000 for "lo W,"
$70,000 for "mid W," and $140,000 for "hi W." The last wealth level
is near the sample median, so these categories all apply to relatively
poor families.75 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly
Table 2.17 Changes in Number of Excess Rooms Among Movers
(independent probit, dependent variable is — 1 if number of rooms







































































•Denotes significant at the 5% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Ownership rates given moves rise with income, particularly for low-
wealth families, as figures 2.6 and 2.7 show for owners and renters,
respectively. Figure 2.8 gives the probability that the result of a move
by a previous owner is housing costs as high as experienced previously;
these probabilities rise with income and wealth and are particularly
sensitive to low liquidity. Figure 2.9 shows that the probability that a
previous owner chooses an "excess size" dwelling after a move is
relatively insensitive to wealth and income, except that low-liquidity
households have a much lower probability of maintaining excess size.
Figure 2.10 shows that the probability of maintaining equity after a
move by a previous owner rises sharply with income, and at low in-
comes is quite sensitive to wealth.76 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
Table 2.18 Changes in Equity Among Movers Who were Owners












































•Denotes significant at 5% level.















































































































































Fig. 2.10 Equity maintained given move (W = wealth)
In sum, these figures suggest that there are economically significant
effects of low liquidity leading to downsizing, relative reductions in
shelter cost, and extraction of equity. This behavior would be expected
from poor households faced with difficult budget choices requiring
trade-offs between shelter costs and nonhousing consumption. The
absence of a significant effect of low liquidity on mobility suggests that
the moves of most elderly homeowners are the result of noneconomic
causes and not forced by economic pressure. There do appear to be
significant economic pressures on low-liquidity renters to move and
reduce shelter costs. These may well involve substantial welfare losses;
our results give no indication that this is a result of a market failure
calling for policy measures beyond distributional policy.80 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
2.4 Test for Unobserved Heterogeneity
As mentioned above, all of the models in this paper have been es-
timated under the assumption that there are no unobserved household
effects. If such effects are present, they invalidate our assumption that
the conditional probability of a household moving in any particular
year is independent of that household's prior mobility decisions (though
it may depend upon previous year household characteristics through
time-dependent explanatory variables). Since estimating models which
allow for unobserved household effects are quite complicated and com-
puter intensive, we have developed a Lagrange Multiplier test for the
presence of unobserved effects which is based on the estimates derived
from models which assume no such effects. We assume a normal ran-
dom effects formulation in which the probability of a move in period
t by household n may be written:
Ptn = F{xtnb + zng),
where F is the standard cumulative normal, xm is the vector of time-
dependent explanatory variables, zn is the household effect, assumed
to be drawn from some distribution q(z) which has mean 0 and unit
variance, and g measures the impact of the household effect on the
household's mobility decision. The null hypothesis is g = 0. It is as-
sumed that the vector b has been previously estimated under this as-
sumption (as in section 2.3, tables 2.10-2.14). We construct a Lagrange
Multiplier test statistic for the hypothesis that g = 0. The derivation,
which is presented in McFadden and Feinstein (1987), is complicated
by the fact that the score for g is singular at g = 0 (due to the fact that
the distribution q{z) is mean zero), an issue which has been previously
discussed by Breusch and Pagan (1980), Chesher (1984), and Lee and
Chesher (1986) in other contexts. The appropriate test is therefore
based on the second derivative of the log likelihood function. The test
statistic is:
LM2 = [tnlmn]yN[CN - BN'AN ^BN], lmn = - Xt atndtnhtnmtn + 2 £, Xs>t dtndsnhtnhsnmtnmsn ,
<*tn = xtnb,
dtn = 1 if the household moves, -1 if not,
htn = f[dtn(xtnb)VF[dtn (xtnb)], mtn = 1 if data is present, 0 if it is missing,
AN = (1/AO Xn cncn',
BN = (1/AO 2n cJmH,
CN = (1/AO 2« lmn\81 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly
where there are N individuals (1,131 in our case) and T time periods
(15 in our case). LM2 is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with
1 degree of freedom.
We have calculated LM2 for the model of table 2.12. The calculated
value far exceeds the 5 percent critical value and decisively rejects the
null of no heterogeneity. This finding indicates that future efforts to
model elderly mobility must come to grips with the statistical issues
involved in estimating models which allow for household effects.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper has given a preliminary analysis of the effects of wealth,
cash flow, and demographic shocks on decisions of the elderly on
whether to move, whether to adjust housing consumption up or down
when moving, and whether to extract equity when moving from an
owner-occupied dwelling. The analysis of price effects has been left
for future research. The current paper makes the simplistic assumption
of no unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently, the resulting models
are unlikely to be reliable predictors of the life-cycle dynamics of mo-
bility of the elderly. In particular, the models are unlikely to predict
accurately the number of moves or the durations of spells between
moves for households observed through time. However, it is more
reasonable to use these models to draw conclusions on the qualitative
impacts of wealth, cash flow, and demographic shocks on mobility and
housing consumption levels.
The models suggest that with the possible exception of downsizing
decisions by renters, conditioned on a decision to move, there is no
evidence that housing choice behavior is affected by capital market
imperfections. Wealth has a generally strong effect on housing choices,
as predicted by the life-cycle model. Mobility and consumption level
decisions are both strongly influenced by some demographic shocks,
notably recent retirement or changes in household size or composition
(e.g., disappearance of husband or wife).
We have also calculated the changes in mobility rates associated with
changes in various explanatory variables. Table 2.19 shows mobility
rates by age of head for the model given in table 2.12, with all other
explanatory variables set to sample means. (Note that this is not the
same as calculating the sample average of the individual household
probabilities, with ages varied parametrically and remaining variables
set to actual values for the household, since the probit model is non-
linear.) Mobility falls with age until age 72, and then rises slightly.
Table 2.20 shows the effects on mobility of different wealth levels
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Table 2.20 Projected Mobility Rates: Effects of Wealth and
Family Composition
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table 2.12 and set all remaining variables to sample means. The de-
mographic shocks of disappearance of the wife or individuals moving
into the household have a substantial effect on mobility, as does recent
retirement. The other demographic variables, changes in number of
children and persons moving out, have modest effects. While wealth
is an important determinant of mobility, small changes in wealth have
small mobility effects.
In summary, we conclude from the analysis of housing behavior for
the elderly completed to date that this population group does not appear
to be substantially disadvantaged by capital market imperfections that
limit the ability to extract equity or dissave, and that mobility is strongly
concentrated in windows opened by demographic shocks, particularly
recent retirement or recent changes in family composition.
2.6 Future Research
This paper is an initial progress report in a multiyear program of
research into the dynamics of housing behavior of the elderly. Future
research plans can be divided into extensions of the simple mobility
and housing consumption level models described above to incorporate
population heterogeneity and model other aspects of choice of housing
state, and extensions to incorporate the effects of price and health.
Extensions of the analysis of the effects of wealth, demographics,
and liquidity will concentrate, first, on removing the assumption of
unobserved population homogeneity. Parametric and "nonparametric"
models with heterogeneity will be estimated. To manage the compu-
tational problems, McFadden's method of simulated moments esti-
mation will be used. We do not have a fully satisfactory method for
handling the initial values problem when both unobserved heteroge-
neity and state dependence are present, but we propose to employ a
nonparametric ("flexible") estimator for the initial value distribution,
with dimensionality restricted by plausible conditional independence
assumptions.
A second part of these extensions will concentrate on refining the
explanatory variables, particularly the lag structure of demographic
shocks, the description of the housing state, and nonlinearities in the
effects of wealth and wealth composition. The third part will concen-
trate on developing a complete transition model between housing states,
including tenure choice and housing consumption level, measured by
real expenditure and dwelling size. These extensions will be limited by
the PSID data.
The final area of future research will concentrate on the effects of
housing prices and the effects of health. The PSID does not provide
adequate information to construct housing prices. Henderson and Ioan-
nides (1986) confine attention to PSID households living in identifiable84 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
SMSAs and use Annual Housing Survey data to calculate housing
prices in these locations. We have not done this because it would
substantially reduce the smaller sample of elderly households. We will
instead use hedonic price equations estimated from Annual Housing
Survey data. Health status is also poorly measured in the PSID. We
will attempt to use limited data on hospitalization, which is available
in only one year, and self-rated level of disability.
Appendix
Description of the Data
Our primary data source is the first fifteen waves of the PSID study,
from 1968 to 1982. We restrict ourselves to elderly households, defined
as those households which satisfy at least one of the following criteria:
(1) The head of household, or "wife" (a term which refers to both
spouses by marriage and cohabitors), or both are aged 50 or above
in 1968.
(2) The identity of the head of household, or "wife," or both changes
during the years 1969-82, and the new head, or "wife," or both
were aged 50 or above in 1968.
There are 1,901 households that fulfill at least one of these criteria. Of
these, 770 are "split-offs," and most of these split-offs refer to young
persons who leave a family in which the parents satisfy either criterion
(1) or (2): 668 refer to households for whom, once the split-off occurs,
the new head is aged 30 or less, and another 60 refer to households
whose new head is aged 30 to 50. We eliminate all split-offs, which
leaves us with 1,131 observations.
We have used the PSID variables to construct a number of additional
variables, which we now describe. An important variable in our models
is the present discounted value of household wealth, which is our
measure of permanent income. Set PERM,, to be household i's present
discounted wealth as of year t, t = 1968, . . ., 1982. PERM,, is defined
to be:
1982
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where the first term refers to the future horizon up to the end of the
PSID data, 1982; the second term refers to an extension of the house-
hold's horizon to 1988, using projections based on the PSID of earlier
years; and the last two terms to the household's financial assets and
home equity in year t. Y\ and HPROJ refer to the household head,
and Y2 and F2PROJ to the "wife" (if there is no "wife," Y2 and
r2PROJ are zero).
Y\is and Y2is are constructed as follows. If the head is working in
year s (s < 1983), Y\is is his wage income; similarly for Y2is. If both
head and wife are retired, Y\is and Y2is each equal one half of the
household's total retirement income. If the head is working and the
wife is retired, Y\is is the head's wage income and Y2is is the house-
hold's total retirement income; similarly if the head is retired and the
wife working.
FIPROJ^ and F2PROJ,5 are constructed as follows. If the head retires
prior to 1982, F1PROJ,5 is his retirement income as of 1982; and sim-
ilarly for the wife (if both are retired each of these is one half of total
retirement income as of 1982). If the head has not retired as of 1982,
he is assumed to retire at age 70, or, if above age 70 as of 1983, at
1983. Until age 70, yiPROJ,5 is equal to his wage income as of 1982;
after age 70, F1PROJ,, is 0.35 of his wage income. Similarly for the
wife.
To construct a measure of financial assets, ASSET,,, we add up the
separate asset income measures for business income, farm income,
garden income, roomer income, and interest, dividends, and rental
income provided by the PSID, and divide by year t's treasury bill rate
(described below), which provides a measure of the wealth generating
the year t asset income. EQUITY,, is just house value minus the out-
standing mortgage.
Finally, DISCOUNT(U) is the discount rate: for s < 1983, it is the
nominal rate on treasury bills, while for s > 1983, it is the nominal T-
bill rate minus the consumer price index (to allow for the fact that real
income post-1982 is in 1982 dollars). Some ambiguity attaches to the
choice of DISCOUNT, as arguments can be made for choosing it to be
the real rather than the nominal rate; however, we have felt that the
majority of nonwage income is likely to derive from bank accounts, in
which case the nominal rate is appropriate. (Source for these numbers
is the Data Resources Inc. publication, Review of the U.S. Economy.)
Our measure of cash flow income, CASH,,, is defined to be the house-
hold's gross year t income, which includes husband and wife's taxable
income, the taxable income of other household members, husband and
wife's transfer income, the transfer income of other household mem-
bers, husband and wife's Social Security income, and the Social Se-
curity income of other household members; minus the husband and
wife's federal taxes and the federal taxes of other household members.86 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
Shelter costs are the sum of property taxes, mortgage payments,
utilities, 2 percent of the house value (for maintenance; source for this
value is the U.S. Statistical Abstract), and rent. The share of cash flow
income devoted to shelter costs is this sum divided by CASH,,.
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Comment Yannis M. Ioannides
The paper by Jonathan Feinstein and Daniel McFadden does an ad-
mirable job in addressing two key issues associated with the dynamics
Yannis M. Ioannides is Professor of Economics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.87 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly
of housing decisions by the elderly. One is the determinants of the
propensity to move. The second is how households adjust their housing
consumption when they do move. The nature of the housing commodity
and the reality of housing markets make it very likely that these two
issues are very much related.
Many commonly held beliefs about the housing behavior of the el-
derly are explained by the econometric models in this paper. The au-
thors conclude that they found no evidence that housing decisions by
the elderly are constrained by imperfections in the capital market. Their
results confirm the predictions of the life-cycle theory model that wealth
is an important determinant of housing decisions, and that mobility
and consumption level changes are prompted by retirement and by
changes in household composition.
This comment addresses some primarily methodological issues. I
argue that a more general analysis of the propensity to move jointly
with housing consumption changes would improve our understanding
of the behavior of the elderly and could be easily implemented. Fur-
thermore, I direct attention to some implications of portfolio-theoretic
considerations within the life-cycle model. This would help to strengthen
the authors' conclusions regarding the impact of capital market
imperfections.
Life-cycle theory suggests that households form a lifetime investment
plan together with a consumption plan. Stylized facts about the path
of income over time would imply that households save the excess of
income receipts over desired expenditures earlier in life and invest
them in a portfolio of assets. Later on in life, households decumulate
by liquidating assets. The actual extent of decumulation depends crit-
ically on the bequest motive. The time pattern of accumulation may
be affected critically by changes in life-cycle characteristics (e.g., when
children or other dependents leave the household, or the death of a
spouse).
Certain nontrivial characteristics of housing require modifications of
the standard life-cycle model. Some such modifications are necessary
for a deep understanding of the particular problems and circumstances
of the elderly. In order to change the quantity and quality of services
generated by a particular dwelling unit, one may either have to move
or to modify structurally an existing unit. In both those cases, costs
are involved which may contain a fixed component, and the optimal
adjustment is complicated by the lumpiness of housing. Another factor
which complicates the analysis of housing decisions is that the amount
of housing owned by households may reflect investment motives, too.
The inflationary experiences of the 1970s and the early 1980s have
shown that housing performed well with respect to inflation adjustment,
and thus its attractiveness as an asset has been well deserved. Yet, it88 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
must be emphasized that there is a substantial geographical variation
in the performance of housing as an inflation hedge, which may in fact
be important in the context of housing decisions by the elderly.
It is well known that a dynamic programming formulation of house-
holds' life-time allocation decisions which explores the above features
quickly becomes intractable. This is recognized in the paper. The only
way analysis can proceed further is to work with reduced forms. This
is, in fact, what the authors pursue. In particular, the paper investigates
separately the households' propensity to move per unit of time and
their choice of whether to reduce or increase their consumption of
housing when moves occur. A number of difficulties are inherent in
this separation, which researchers familiar with these issues are well
aware of. Even so, discussing them further here may be helpful in
interpreting the results in the paper.
I will start with the authors' analysis of the propensity to move. The
authors use a Bernoulli model to analyze the propensity to move per
year. This model implies that the duration of stay in a given dwelling
and for a given set of characteristics of the househola is geometrically
distributed. (If time were continuous, it would be exponentially dis-
tributed.) It is straightforward to show that for the geometric distri-
bution, the hazard rate (i.e., the probability of moving in a particular
period given that no move has already taken place) is constant over
time. However, it is well known that with heterogeneity and duration
dependence, the hazard rate may be an increasing or a decreasing
function of duration. Forcing a constant hazard rate on duration data
makes it quite likely that important dynamic relationships are being
missed. It is not surprising, therefore, that the hypothesis of a constant
hazard rate can be easily rejected.
More general models for the propensity to move characterized by
a richer dynamic structure may be easily utilized, especially since
reduced forms are used anyway (Heckman 1981). An alternative way
to easily introduce heterogeneity, duration, and state dependence would
be to look at mobility through the duration of residence spells. Prior
experience from applications of such an approach and the richness of
the PSID data are quite encouraging (see Henderson and Ioannides
1988; Ioannides 1987; Rosenthal 1986). Competing risks models, which
are also reduced form, may also be applied fruitfully (Pickles and
Davies 1985). In contrast, the attractiveness of the model underlying
the Feinstein-McFadden formulation is that mobility in effect follows
from comparing every period's utilities from different alternative
courses of action. In fact, it is important to direct attention to the
remarkably good fit obtained by Model 2, table 2.9. The authors'
reduced-form model seems to perform quite well.89 The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly
I will now discuss results reported in the paper regarding changes
in housing consumption among elderly movers. It would, of course,
be desirable to have a full model of the demand for housing by the
elderly, but that requires availability of housing price data. The authors
state they wish to investigate only whether significant changes in hous-
ing consumption take place when elderly do change residences. Such
changes may take the form of changes in mode (owners becoming
renters and vice versa) or of changes in the quantity of housing services
consumed. Both kinds of changes may coexist. The latter are empha-
sized, and the corresponding results are reported in tables 2.15 and
2.16. A probit model for the changes in housing expenditure as a func-
tion of wealth, of various socioeconomic characteristics, and of two
measures of liquidity constraints gives similar results to those obtained
by Venti and Wise (ch. 1, in this volume). This is all the more interesting
and significant because key wealth variables—like earned income wealth
and, especially, financial wealth—had to be constructed by the authors
from other data available in the PSID. Assets data are readily available
in the Retirement History Survey (RHS), which is the data used by
Venti and Wise. (Further work in the future along such lines can take
advantage of the availability of assets data within the PSID, starting
from the 1984 wave of interviews).
There is, of course, no unambiguous way to define what constitutes
substantial change in shelter costs or dwelling size. The authors' ar-
bitrary, and yet reasonable, definitions for such changes do throw light
on the underlying question about the behavior of the elderly. The rel-
ative magnitudes of such changes must be related to typical magnitudes
of transactions costs associated with these changes. While realtor fees
and moving costs may be estimated with some accuracy, there is no
clue as to how to account for the nonpecuniary costs of moving. Thus,
observed reluctance by the elderly to downsize their dwelling units
may, in principle, be interpreted as large perceived transactions costs.
However, large perceived transactions costs are not the whole story.
In adjusting their housing expenditure after substantial changes in so-
cioeconomic characteristics relevant to housing demand, households
are motivated by the dual role of housing as a consumer durable and
an investment good. That is, within a life-cycle theory model, we could
consider the quantity of housing stock desired for consumption pur-
poses (hc) and, separately, the amount of housing stock desired for
portfolio purposes (hi) (Henderson and Ioannides 1983). For a number
of reasons which are characteristic of housing markets, such as trans-
actions costs and moral hazard, households may have an incentive to
equate hc to hj. However, in general, households that want to have
hc > ht would rent the respective amount of housing services. On the90 Jonathan Feinstein/Daniel McFadden
other hand, those who desire hc < h{ would typically use part of the
housing stock they own to produce housing services for their own
consumption.
I will now utilize these considerations to examine whether the be-
havior of the elderly, as portrayed by the paper, does conform to the
prediction of life-cycle theory. In particular, since the desire to adjust
housing consumption does indeed constitute a primary impetus to move,
do elderly households change their holdings of housing when they do
move in the direction predicted by the life-cycle model, as augmented
by the above considerations peculiar to housing? Some of the special
circumstances of the elderly allow us to test, in a somewhat unique
fashion, some key predictions of the theory. Elderly who are close to
retirement (or have already retired) operate with considerably reduced
uncertainty with respect to income. They are also forced to consider
the composition of their wealth portfolios, within which housing figures
prominently.
A key prediction of the theory is that households should decumulate
later in life by liquidating some of their wealth. Thus, as wealth de-
creases with age, so should its housing component—unless, of course,
housing behaves in an extraordinary way within wealth portfolios. The
amount of housing stock desired for consumption purposes, on the
other hand, should not vary very much with age. To the extent that
many households find it attractive to equate hc to hi, the resulting
decrease in housing stock held, h* = hc = hj, is not as pronounced
as decumulation of wealth required by the life-cycle model. Therefore,
failure to sell and move into smaller quarters, which is what we typically
observe, is not inconsistent with perfect capital markets as long as one
recognizes certain characteristic rigidities of housing. Furthermore, the
above observation along with a bequest motive may make h* completely
invariant with age (see figure 2.11). Nonpecuniary transactions costs
contribute further to this noted tendency. The authors' conclusions are
thus strengthened by this argument.
The probit model of choosing whether to downsize or upsize would
be much more revealing if price comparisons had also been included.
Furthermore, because several of the determinants of changes in shelter
costs may also contribute to the decision of whether or not to change
mode, a bivariate probit model would be a simple way to model those
joint discrete decisions.
Finally, I would like to direct attention to the test for unobserved
heterogeneity conducted in section 2.4. This test is novel and very
powerful, as it tests a particular hypothesis—in the present case, the
Bernoulli model for households' propensity to move—against a random







Fig. 2.11 Housing and wealth
processes (or duration data) are typically very complicated. Therefore
such a simple test is a most welcome addition to our arsenal.
To conclude, I should emphasize that all-in-all the paper does an
impressive job of illuminating housing decisions of the elderly by strik-
ing a remarkable economy between data utilization and complexity of
econometric modeling.
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